Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1962

Cecil R. Martin v. Carl Ehlers : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Rich & Strong; Lawrence L. Summerhays; Attorney for Respondent;
Hurd, Bayle & Hurd; Wallace B. Lauchnor; Attorneys for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Martin v. Ehlers, No. 9565 (Utah Supreme Court, 1962).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3942

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

UN,v ~-·' .; f"Y UTAH

=============A~PR9 1962
IN THE SUP.REME COURT LA~-" '-i&J•'ARY.
of the
STATE OF UITAH

__:~IL':D

G-· 1962
CECIL R. MARTIN
Plaintiff and Respondent, __ .. ___ ____________
. ----------------··-··- ------Cierk, Supreme Court, Utah

vs.

No. 9565

CARL EHLERS,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from the judgment of the Third District Court of
Salt Lake County.
Honorable A. H. Ellett, Judge.
RICH & STRONG and
LAWRENCE L. SUMME-RHAYS
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent
HURD, BAYLE & HURD and
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR
1105 ·Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE .... ·--------········-···-··----

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT·---·-----------·-···-···················--·

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL---------------------------················---····

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS··-·--···-···-·······-····-·-·---···---·-····-····-·····----

2

ARGUMENT --··--·-··-··-··-------·----------·------------------------------------------------- 5
I. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S
FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT, APPELLANT WAS NEGLIGENT.-------------------------------------------- 5
II. PLAINTIFF, RESPONDENT WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT A8 A MATTER OF
LAW. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY. -------------------- 16
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------·---------------------------------------- 16
CASES CITED
Grammier- Dismukes Company v. Peyton, 22 SW (2) 544,
Texas -----------------------------·---------------------·-------------------------------------- 12
Jensen v. Taylor, 2U(2) 196, 271 P(2) 838 ____________________________ 10, 12
Johnson v. Maynard, 9U(2) 268, 342 P(2) 884 ............ 11, 12, 14, 15
Lakoduk v. Cruger, 296 P(2) 690, Wash. ____________________________________ 10
Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. (2) 475, 75 P(2) 602 ______
Mayor and City Counsel of Baltimore et al, v. Fire Insurance
Salvage Corpo·ration of Baltimore et al., 219 Md. 75,
148 A(2) 444 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------Montalto v. Fondulac County, 76 NW (2) 279, Wisconsin ________
Russell v. Nadeau, 29 A(2) 916, Maine ________________________________________
Ruth v. Rhodes, 185 P(2) 304, Arizona ______________________________________
Travis v. Collett, 17 NW(2) 68, Minn. ________________________________________

10

12
12
12
12
12

STATUTES CITED
Title 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended____________

6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUP.REME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
CECIL R. MARTIN
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

No. 9565

CARL EHLERS,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF T·HE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover for personal injuries
and property damage arising out of an intersection
collision betw~en the plaintiff driving his automobile
and the defendant driving an emergency police vehicle.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and
judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the verdict and for
judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or in .the
alternative, a new trial.
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STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
Gene~rally SJ)eak:ing, tl;le facts set forth in the ap~
pellant's brief are correct, but in. reviewing the evidence
the Court must consider the eviderrce in the light most
favorable to the· plaintiff's case inasmuch as the judg~
rnent was in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff will,
therefore, set out a few exceptions to appellant's statement of facts and some additional facts which plaintiff
contends support the judgment and the jury's finding.
On J nne 10, 1959, at about 5 :30 P.lYl., the plaintiff
was eastbound on 27th South Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah, and the defendant, driving in a sheriff's vehicle
with a red light on and siren operating, was southbound
on Seventh East Street. The red light was located on
the right side of his car at the base of the windshield
( Exh. P -4). There were two lines of vehicles occupying
the west half of Seventh East Street north of 27th South
Street extending some distance to the north of the intersection (R 110, 121, 150 & 157) and blo:cking the vision
of each of the drivers. The defendant was traveling in
the lane of traffic for northbound vehicles east of the
two lines of vehicles, and as he neared the intersection
he stated that he looked to the west but could only see
a few fee't (R 182). The light was red for him as he
approached the intersection (R 111, 120 & 140). The
plaintiff, as he approached the intersection, looked to
the left along Seventh East Street but did not see the
police car approaching because of the stopped cars along
Seventh East Street (R 142'). The station wagon of the
witness, Tho1nas Fyans, was stopped at the crosswalk
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,vvw
..&f- the inside lane on the north side of Seventh East
(R. 111) and the witness, Daniel Gehrke, in his vehicle
waH stopped irmnediately behind the station wagon. The
plaintiff was from 30 to 100 feet from the intersection
when the light turned green for him (R 120 & 140). He
was traveling at about 30 miles per hour as he approached the intersection. lie testified that he did not
hear the siren and that until the light turned green for
him there was traffic going across 27th South Street in
a north-south direction (R 140). I-Ie saw the police car
as soon as it came from behind the two lines of stopped
cars and applied his brakes leaving brake marks before
and up to the impact as follows : right front, 24 feet
seven inches; right rear, 14 feet 5 inches; left front,
2-:1: feet 9 inche1s; left rear 12 feet (Exh. P-1, R 82). The
impact occurred 17 feet 10 inches east of the west line
of the intersection and 24 feet 7 inches south of the north
side of the intersection (Exh. P-1). The defendant stated
that he slowed his vehicle as he approached the intersection hut admitted that he could have been going 40
miles per hour at the time of impact (R 97 & 173).
Officer Ehlers, the defendant, did not see the paintiff's
vehicle at any time before impact (R 172). He stated
that he saw no cars moving in the intersection and that
there were cars on the east side of the intersection, hut
he was unable to see whether they were in the lane's of
traffic or over to the right (R 182.). The plaintiff said
he saw a car or cars on the east side hut they could have
been parked cars not in the lane of traffic (R 140).
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.Tl).e independe,nt witnesses, Thomas ,Fyans and
Daniel Gehrke, did not see any vehicles stopped on the
east side of the intersection although both of them were
in excellent position to have seen them if the,re were any
there (R 114,-151. & 163). Thomas Fyans testified that
he he~rd the siren when the police car was 500 to 600
feet away from the intersection (R 149) but while the
light was green for east-west traffic on 27th South after
he had heard the siren the traffic continued to flow along
said 27th South and did not hesitate.

"Q. ****. Had the cars on 27th South Street,
going either east or west, stopped to allow the
police 'Car to come through, did you notice~
A. Well, at that point- now you are talking at the time that the light just turned green
to me~
Q~

Well, at any point you coUld tell us.

A. That would have been controlled at the
time it was red, the light was red, that the traffic
of course was passing on 27th South. And at the
time that it turned green, well, to answer your
question specifically, I don't think anyone hesitated on 27th South. I mean I think they were
unable, of course, to - well, that would be a
supposition. I didn't see any hesitation on 27th
South.
Q. As the police car neared the intersection
did you notice any cars going either east or west
stopped to let the police car go through~

A. Well, it see1ns to me at that time I was of
course concerned what would happen. I could

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

see the police car coming south, and I looked at
the intersection and the intersection was clear."
(R 151)

The witness, Daniel Gehrke, testified that he did
not hear the siren until the police ear was within three
to four car lengths frmn his car (R 111 & 112) ; that the
car was moving 30 to 40 miles per hour, and that the
operator may have taken his foot off the gas, hut he
didn't know whether he braked or not (R 113). Officer
Ehlers testified he didn't know whether the siren was
on low or high pitch as he arrived at the interse:etion
(R 180) but he did state his vehiele was equipped with
a stick shift and he shifted gears as he neared the intersection (R 173). The witness, Fyans, also te·stified that
the police car was going 35 to 40 miles peT hour, that
there was some hesitation of the ear as it passed him,
and that the driver let his foot off the gas or touched
the brake. He eould see some hesitation of the ear (R
154). The front of the plaintiff's vehiele struek the right
side of the police ear driven by the defendant. The
posted speed limit on eaeh of these stree~ts was 30 miles
per hour.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORT'S THE JURY'S FINDING
THAT THE APPELLANT WAS GUIUTY OF NEGLIGENCE.

The evidence is not in dispute that there were two
lines of traffi'e stopped on the west side of Seventh East
Street north of the intersection which equally blocked
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the view of the drivers of both vehicles involved in the
accident; that the light was green for plaintiff and red
for the defendant, and that the defendant entered the
intersection against the red light traveling at a spe·ed
of 35 to 40 miles per hour from a position east of the
two lines of stopped traffic. The defendant claims that
he was not guilty of negligence and asserts· an exemption
under Seetion 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
provided as follows at the· time the accident occurred:
Authorized emergenCY vehicle shall be exempt from the
driving restrictions imposed under sections 41-6-20 to
and including 41-6-28, 41-6-46 to and including 41-6-82,
and 41-6-91 to and including 41-6-106 when driven under
the. following conditions:
1

(1). Said exemption shall apply whenever any
said vehicle is being driven in response to an emergency
call or when used in the pursuit of an actual or suspected
violator of law, or when responding to but not returning
from a fire alarm.
( 2). Said exemption herein granted to an. authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when the driver
of any said vehicle while in motion sounds audible signal
by bell, siren or exhaust whistle as may be reasonably
necessary, and when the vehicle is equipped with at least
one lighted lamp displaying a red light visible under
normal atmospher:Ic conditions from a distance of 500
feet to the front of such vehicle.
(b). The foregoing provisions shall not relieve
the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the
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duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from
the consequences of an arbitrary e x e r c i s e of the·
privileges declared in this section.
rr'he appellant, driving at 35 to 40 miles per hour in
a southerly direc.tion east of these two lines of traffic
in the lane for northbotmd traffic on Seventh East
Street, was traveling in total disregard of the rights of
other motorists using the highways. At the speed he was
traveling he had no hope of being able to s.ee between the
two lines of stopped cars which he was passing to
detern1ine whether or not there were cars corning fr01n
the west, the direction in which his view was blocked.
The distance from the front of the station wagon driven
by the witness, Fyans, to the point of impact was only
slightly in excess of 25 feet. Traveling 35 to 40 miles
per hour defendant would have not more than about
one-half seeond after emerging from the lines of cars
within which to observe whether or not any vehicles were
coming from the west and to take action to avoid an
accident. Likewise, he knew or should have known that
vehicles approaching from the west would not be able to
see him in time to avoid an accident.
The red spotlight on appellant's vehicle was at the
base of the windshield on the right side of his car and
would, therefore, not be visible to the plaintiff as he
approached on 27th South Street. One of the warning
devices to give other drivers notice of the approach of
defendant's vehicle was, therefore, ineffective as far as
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the plaintiff_ was. concerned because it could not readily
be seen and.the defendant was well aware. of this fact or
should have hee:p..
The evidence is clear that the light was red against
the defendant as _he approached the intersectio:p., and no
claim has been made by him that it was otherwise. It is
only natural that traffic facing the red semaphore
should he stopped. There. was. nothing, therefore, about
the stopped traffic on the north and south side of the
intersection to give the defendant any indication one
way o:r another that his light had been seen by east-west
traffic or his siren heard.. The defendant was unable
actually to say whether ther~ were any cars on the east
side of the intersection but could only say that nothing
was moving (R 181 & 182). The fact that both the
witnesses Fyans and Gep.rke sta:ted there were no cars
stopped on the east side of the intersection is significant.
The j11ry could easily have found that there were no:p.e.
The appellant contends that all automobiles at the
intersection either heard or observed the emergency
vehicle approaching and yielded the right-of-way but the
evidence does not show this to be so, because all northsouth traffic was stopped for the red light facing northsouth traffic and theTe is an actual dispute in the evidence as to whether there was any traffic stopped on the
east side of the intersection. The witness Fyans claimed
he heard the siren and located the police vehicle when
the police car was 500 to 600 feet away (R 149). The
witness Gehrke, immediately behind Fyans, testified he
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did not hear the siren until the vehicle was three to four
car lengths behind him (R 111 & 112). Itis interesting
to note that Fyans .also testified that the red light on
the officers car was on top and that it was a flashing
type red light, whereas the evidence is positive from the
pictures of the car (Exh. P-4) that the light was at the
base of the windshield. The officer and other witnesses
testified also that it was a constant light.
There is no evidence from any witness in a moving
vehicle that any siren was heard and the plaintiff testified that he did not hear the siren. The fact that he was
in a moving vehrcle would have some effect on his
ability to hear the siren. The officer did not know
whether the siren was on high or low pitch as he neared
the intersection (R 180), and wasn't able to say which
sound carried better, but certainly this would be a
question for the jury to determine whether he was acting
reasonably in activating the siren.
The fact that traffic continued to flow normally
along 27th South Street as the officer approached is
some indication that the siren could not properly be
he·ard. Certainly the plaintiff's opportunity to hear the
siren was not as good as the witnesses who were stopped
at the intersection, and the witness, Gehrke, did not hear
the siren until the poli'ce car was right close to his car,
even though his window was down. He states that he
had his left arm out the window. The eiVidence clearly
supports the jury's findings of negligence upon the part
of the defendant both as to speed and lookout which

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

constitute failure upon the part of the defendant to
drive with due regard for the safety of all persons.
Appellant has cited several cases and particularly relies
upon Lakoduk vs. Cruger, (Wash.) 296 P(2) 690 which
case cites and quotes the California case of Lucas vs.
City of Los Angeles (10 Cal(2) 475, 75 P.(2) 602) which
holds that the expression in the Statute authorizing the
exemptions granted to emergency vehicles "shall not
relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle
from the: duty to drive with due regard for the safety of
all persons", means that as long as he is sounding his
siren and exhibiting a red light he has complied with the
requirements of exercising due care for the safety of
other motorists. This rule and the reasoning in this
case was rejected in the case of Jensen vs. Taylor, 2
Utah (2) 196, 271 P (2) 838, in which our court stated that
to adopt the view oontended for by the defendant would
ignore comp~etely the specific limitations placed by the
legislature on the driver of an emergency vehicle. In
the Jensen 'Case the trial court instructed the jury to
determine if defendant used his privilege properly by
reducing his speed as n1uch as may have been necessary
for safe ope:ration of the fire truck and by driving with
due regard for the safety of all persons. The Utah
Appellate Court stated that the instruction was proper
and that the question of negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause was a jury question.
At the time of the Jensen vs. Taylor case the Statute
provided that an e1nergency vehicle may proceed past
a red signal but shall slow down as necessary for safety
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but may proceed cautiously past such red or stop sign
or signal. This portion of the Statute was eliminated
by the 1955 legislature but the requirement to exercise
due regard for the safety of others was. not changed.
In the case of Johnson vs. Maynard, 9 Utah(2) 268,
P ( 2) 884, the accident occurred on November 21,
1955. The same s.tatutory provisions were in effect as
were in effect at the time of the accident in the case now
before this Court. There the defendant, a police offrcer,
was on an emergency call to investigate a fatal accident
that had just occurred and was traveling north on Washington Boulevard in Ogden. The plaintiff was approaching Washington Boulevard going west on 27th Street
with a green light in her favor. vVhen the defendant was
about 350 feet south of the intersection he turned on his
red signal light and stepped on his siren button. The
siren died down while he was shifting into second to
pick up speed. He said he was traveling just under 40
miles per hour. Just as plaintiff passed the center of
the intersection the defendant's car struck plaintiff's ca.r
on the right side just behind the door post. In that case
the Court said:
~j--1:2

"'The evidence unquestionably would support a finding of negligence against the defendant even though he was responding to an
emergency call and while operating his red signal
light and siren was exempted from certain usual
traffic rules, insofar as material here: from speed
regulations and obeying traffic lights. But the
statute also provides that this shall not relieve
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the driver from the duty to drive with due regard
for the safety of all persons under the circumstances.''
Our Court in the Jensen vs. Taylor and the Johnson v.s.
Maynard cases, supra, has followed the same reasoning
and reached the same results as several other states
having statutes similar to Utah's. These states have
expressly rejected the doctrine laid down by the California and Washington cases cited by appellant. See the
following:
Md.: Mayor and City Counsel of Baltimore, et al.
vs. Fire Insurance Salvage Corporat~on of Balti:more,
et al, 1959, 219 ~1:d. 75, 148 A(2) 444. Wis.: Montalto
vs. Fondulac County, 1956, 76 NW (2) 279. Ariz.: Ruth
vs. Rhodes, 185 P(2) 304. l\1:e.: Ru.ssell v.s. Nadeau, 29
A(2) 916. Texas: Grammier-Di·smukes Company vs.
Peyton, 22 SW(2) 544. Minn.: Travis vs. Collett, 17
NW(2) 68.
In the l\1:ayor and City Counsel of Baltimore case, supra,
which involved the interpretation of a statute similar to
ours, the Court said:
"We, therefore, hold that under a proper
construction of Section 214, the provision that
requires the op~rator of an authorized emergency
vehicle to do so 'with due regard for the safety
of all persons using the street' renders him liable
for ordinary negligence, namely a failure to exercise reasonable care and diligence under the circumstances. ******In holding that operators of
authorized emergency vehicles are liable for
ordinary negligence under the statutes mentioned,
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. wti do. not, of course, mean to state that their
conduct in the operation of such vehicles is measured by exactly the same yardstick as the actions
of the operators of conventional vehicles. The
urgency of their missions demands that they respond to ~calls with celerity and as expeditiously
as is reasonably possible. When giving audible
signals, they are, within limitations, relieved from
speed regulations, rules of· the road and certain
other provisions. It is generally recognized that
firemen when going to a fire often drive at a rate
of speed that could not be justified by the ordinary motorist. They are not required to stop for
red lights <Yr other stop signals, but may slow
down and proceed cautiously through them. However, they are bound to exercise reasonable precautions against the extraordinary dangers of
the situation that the proper performance of their
duties compels them to create. When dealing
with the operation of emergency vehicles, it is
particularly appropriate to recognize that negligence and reasonable care are relative terms and
their application depends upon the situation of
the parties and the degree of care and vigilance
which circumstances reasonably impose. N egligence and reasonable care derive their only
signifi'cance from a factual background, and that
background must contain evidence of circumstances which justify a legitimate inference that
in the exercise of reasonable care and prudence
injury could have been avoided."
POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF, WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The plaintiff was approaching a signal-controlled
intersection with the green light in his favor. Cross
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traffic had stopped for the light on both the north and
south sides of the interse·ction before he arrived and he
had a right to rely on his right-of-way until something
appeared to indicate it was not safe to do so. He was
driving within the speed limit and was keeping a proper
lookout along the highway ahead of him as is evidenced
by the fact that he was able to apply his brakes and
leave 24 feet of skid marks prior to impact (Exh. P-1,
R 82). The plaintiff 'either saw the red light of the police
vehicle or heard the siren just before reaching the west
intersection line in order to react as he did to the danger.
He stated he did not hear the siren or se,e the red light,
but the physical facts would indicate that he may have
done. The appellant contends that all others at the
intersection heard the siren, but it is significant that
the witness, Gehrke, only one car back from the intersection and on the side from which the police vehicle
approached did not hear the siren until the police car
was within three to four car lengths from him, and that
the witness, Fyans, although he claimed to have heard
the siren from a distance of 500 to 600 fe,et, testified that
traffic along 27th South Street proceeded without hesitation (R 151). The jury made a specific finding that
plaintiff was not negligent in failing to heed the warning
of the siren and red light of the Ehlers car and indicated
that plaintiff was exercising due care in the operation
of his vehicle and attention thereto (R 55 and 56). In
the Johnson vs. lJfaynard case, supra, the Court said:

'"A driver approaching a signal-controlled
intersection with the light in her favor has the
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right-of-way and can rely on it until something
appears to indicate it is not safe to do so. It is,
of cours,e, true that she cannot assume full protection by the traffic light and remain oblivious
to cars approaching against it. But it is to be
kept in mind that the management of an automobile in downtown traffi'c demands an awareness of a number of things so that she cannot be
giving her full attention to any particular hazard.
She must he paying some attention to the actual
operation of her car and also be aware of possible
hazards from a number of directions; to the road
ahead and any possible obstac.le·s therein, or pedestrians who may be in or approaching the crosswalk to traffic which Inay be approaching from the
east and/ or turning right or left in the intersection. It is because of these numerous hazards
and to facilitate an orderly flow of traffic that
traffic lights are installed. They permit the
motorist to enter the interse:ction with some
assurance of safety when the traffic light is in
his favor. Being under the obligation to divide
her attention to the numerous hazards just adverted to, plus the assurance that she might
reasonably take from the fact that the traffic
light was presumably holding any traffic from
entering the intersection from the south, the trial
court correctly determined that reasonable minds
might find that in entering the intersection, as
plaintiff did, she was within the limits of due
care under the circumstances and consequently
the question of her contributory negligence was
one of fact for the jury."
We submit that the facts in the case now before this
Court make out a much stronger case to go to the jury
than did the facts in Johnson vs. Maynard case with
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respect to the: question of contributory negligence and
that the jury's finding in that regard was proper.
POINT III
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY TH.NT WAS PREJUDICIAL
TO THE DEFENDANT.

The defendant complains that by the Court's instruction No. 16 the jury was instructed that both respondent
and appellant were to be judged by the same standard
of care. However, in its instructions No. 12, 13 and 14
(R 44, 45, 46) the Court instructed the jury in the specific
privileges and duties of the respective drivers under the
applicable laws and gave to the jury the standard of
care by which the operator of the police vehicle was to be
judged. In instruction No. 9 (R 4i) the Court instructed
the jury that they were to consider all the instructions
as a whole and to· regard each in the light of all the
others and not to single out any certain sentence or any
individual point or instruction and ignore the others.
There was, th~refore; nothing misleading· in the instructions to the jury. Instruction No. 16 and the special
verdict was under the rest of the instructions considered
by the jury subject to the background of instructions
12, 13 and 14 given by the Court.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence clearly
supports the finding of the jury that the defendant was
negligent; that the plaintiff was not contributorily negli-
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gent; that plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence a.s a matter of law, and that there was no prejudice
at all accorded to the defendant in the Court's instructions. The jury's verdict should, therefore, be upheld.
Respectfully submitted.

RICH & STRONG and
LAWRENCE L. SUMME·RHAYS
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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